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The fast development of robo-advice has responded to a growing demand for automation and 
enhanced capabilities to industrialize investment advisory (IA) solutions in the FinTech landscape. Until 
recently, the first generation of robo-advisors have naturally focused on the low-end segment of the 
IA market, mostly thanks to a rather low sophistication of the portfolio allocation systems based on 
simplistic versions of Modern Portfolio Theory, leaving wealth managers with no serious competition 
from fully digitized solutions. Nowadays, the second generation of robo-advisors is more ambitious, 
both from a scientific and an ergonomic point of view. Even though we are not yet witnessing the age 
of industrialized big data or machine learning fully automated investment advisors, the maturity level 
of today’s robo-advisors is sufficient to accommodate behavioral sources of complexity like mental 
accounting or loss aversion at the investor’s level. The pressure on margins induced by regulation and 
digitalization gradually increases the competitive advantage of robotized IA in the mass affluent and 
private banking segments, making them a serious threat to those incumbent firms that cannot adapt 
with proper tooling or niche offering. In the near future, the mature generation of robo-advisors, with 
full deep learning and data treatment capacities, will presumably coexist with those firms that have 
been actively preparing today, that will use performant tools besides human expertise, but in a world 
in which fees will presumably have largely decreased and service quality will have been improved, at 
















The surge of “robo-advisors”, i.e. automated personal financial advisors, in the world of FinTech is (or 
at least should be) by no means a surprise in the current financial landscape. It corresponds to an 
unprecedented match between the customer demand for independent, highly cost-efficient 
investment advice in a MiFID II-driven transparent relationship, and the capacity to industrialize the 
whole individual portfolio management process in a digital environment. 
In parallel with the organic development of automated investment advice, the traditional banking 
industry has expressed its willingness to gradually shift from traditional financial intermediation to 
activities generating fees and commissions, amongst which wealth management and asset 
management (preferably both simultaneously) represent some of the most promising directions. This 
evolution is fuelled by the low-for-long interest rate environment and the strengthening of capital 
requirements, which lead to the erosion of the net interest margin and the search for alternative, less 
capital-intensive sources of profits. The activities surrounding investment advice are a natural 
candidate for this purpose. 
One could reasonably wonder whether the intersection between large banks’ growing interest in the 
investment advice (henceforth IA) business, on the one hand, and the surge of automated and easily 
scalable end-to-end IA systems could rapidly lead to a tendency to standardize, or even commoditize, 
the currently largely expert-based wealth management landscape.  
In this paper, we investigate the current needs for IA in the different segments of the investors’ 
population and the degree to which an adequate response can be brought by the automatization and 
digitization of the advisory process, whose ultimate stage is represented by robo-advisors. Then, we 
discuss the maturity level of the current robo-advisory landscape and the directions in which it is 
currently evolving from a scientific point of view, but also how it is currently threatening or 
contribution to the traditional wealth management industry. 
Our thesis is that the tendency to industrial the IA activities in the retail banking industry will inevitably 
lead to a rather rapid omnipresence of automated systems, be them fully digital or through more 
traditional channels like the hybrid “phygital” medium. Currently, the real question regarding the 
coexistence of human-driven and digitally-powered IA approaches mostly affects the intermediate 
segment between pure retail and high net worth (and higher) sub-populations of individual investors. 
There is a significant complementarity between man and machine, but this should be well-understood 














In the longer term, a new equilibrium might then prevail, in which the pressure induced by automation 
on the IA landscape will have led, at the moment the process will have matured, to the coexistence of 
high-quality human and robot-based offerings to the investor.  
People’s needs for investment advisory services 
 
The stream of economic research mostly fueled by Thomas Piketty following his investigations of 
inequalities in France (Piketty, 2003) has led to a debate about the relative dominance of rentiers 
versus working rich in the developed economies. This debate is underpinned by the robust and 
repeated finding that capitalist societies generate a significant unequal distribution of income 
(whatever its source) throughout the population, and that the accumulation of such inequalities 
naturally lead to a much greater distribution of wealth within the very same population. The following 
graph represents the Lorenz curves of income and wealth inequality in France.  
 






















The horizontal axis reflects the percentile of each member the population, from the poorest to the 
richest, while the vertical axis represents the percentile of income (red line) or wealth (black line) of 
the same person. The green line represents the full-equality repartition. As the black line is more 
convex than the red one, this implies a greater inequality of the distribution of wealth than income 
(as measured by the Gini coefficient).  
Our focus is not on the causes of this unbalanced repartition, but rather on the consequences. 
Inequalities in wealth distribution induce a larger difference between the percentage of population 
(ranked from poorest to richest) and the percentage of wealth that these people own. This has 
practical consequences regarding private banking customer segmentation.  
More than for many products or services, the vast majority of the investment management clientele 
owns a relatively small amount of unit wealth. This category of customers does not only encompass 
the “retail banking” segment, but also the “mass affluent” (aka “personal” or “privileged”) customer 
groups. At the other end of the spectrum, the “ultra-high net worth” (UHNW) customers concentrate 
a very large fraction of the aggregate wealth within a very small group. In the middle, we find a group 
of wealthy people, featuring the “private banking” and the lower segment of “wealth management” 
clients.  
The thresholds for these groups of persons and the level of service offered by various banks or wealth 
managers may considerably differ from one institution to another – this is not the point of this paper 
– but we focus here on the types of needs of these customers regarding IA services and the ways 
financial institutions can or do respond to these needs.  
The following table reports the dispersion of the “gross patrimony including non-marketable assets”1 








                                                          
1 The inequalities regarding the “gross patrimony excluding non-marketable assets” are even greater (INSEE, 





















Challenges Robo ? 
Small to 
moderate 
90% 53% 0.16M 
• Not first-order matter (generating income more 
important) 
• Limited need for investment management 
• High relative cost of customized IA 
• Low propensity to pay for non-subsidized service 
Yes 
High 9% 31% 0.92M 
• First-order matter (at least as important as labor 
income) 
• High need for specific care for the patrimony 
• Acceptable cost of customized IA 
• Average propensity to pay with little bargaining power 
? 
Very high 1% 16% 4.30M 
• Quasi-job, with cross-generation responsibility 
• Need for global care, leading to family office-type of 
service 
• High cost and sophistication 





The third segment of Table 1 is not the easiest one to serve. As wealth management is a primary 
concern, the dedication of the service provider should be extremely clear. Usually, the services that 
are requested by the client go way beyond the pure discretionary management of a securities 
portfolio. Regarding this latter activity, the client’s expectations are driven by the quest of excellence 
in asset management. Investment advice is not only about finding and managing a suitable portfolio, 
it is about extending asset classes, creating multiple ledgers, and above all creating added-value with 
respect to peers by yielding positive active return. In asset management terms, this means generating 
positive and sustained alpha. Such an approach is close to institutional portfolio management and is 
reasonably not properly met by a robo-advisory service, at least by the ones of the first generation 
(see below). 
On the other hand, the evolution of IA services in the retail and mass affluent segments (small to 
moderate wealth) is largely inevitable. The combination of the pressure on margins induced by MiFID 
II, which came into force in 2018, with the increase in competition underlid by the quest for non-
interest income channels makes the cost/income ratio of this business less and less compatible with 













Each customer has little to invest and, as fees are largely proportional to assets under management, 
the resources (and thus time) that can be devoted by the bank to each customer are too limited to 
make this worthwhile for each party. To remain profitable, many institutions have no other choice 
than to industrialize this activity. Robo-advisors represent an element of the multiple solutions that 
are investigated in order to address this challenge. 
In the middle of Table 1, mid-to-high net worth individuals (those that mostly belong to the upper 
range of private banking and to the lower range of wealth management services) represent at the 
same time a relatively demanding population and a potentially profitable clientele. The problem for 
finance professionals is the diversity and complexity of their expectations. A priori, there is no definite 
case for either purely human or purely automated provision of services. Nevertheless, a deeper 
investigation into what the machine can bring to the human expert could provide us with a number 
of valuable insights about this matter. 
Robo-advice 1.0 and wealth management market segmentation 
 
A robo-advisor is at the intersection of finance and technology (which explains why robo-advisors are 
called with the generic name of “FinTech”). On the one hand, it mimics the process that a personal 
advisor would follow when providing investment advice. If done properly, this process applies a series 
of rules that combine elements of psycho-sociology, economics and statistics. Even though some of 
these rules are highly judgmental and qualitative, it is perfectly possible to rest on a series of 
algorithms in order to reach the desired level of service. This is where the technological aspects, on 
the other hand, can help: not only the digital environment can simulate the ergonomics of a 
convenient onboarding and monitoring process, but it can also apply or enrich a number of these 
algorithms that let the customer progress from the first contact to the portfolio allocation and follow-
up processed in a fully disintermediated environment. 
The major steps of the fully automated discretionary process are (at least) fivefold (not necessarily in 
a sequential order): 
1. Gather customer data in order to (i) comply with the regulation (MiFID, AML…) and (ii) feed 
the system with individual-specific inputs that can be used to parametrize the allocation and 
planning processes; 
2. Gather financial data in order to understand the risk, return and diversification properties of 
assets and portfolios with the aim to feed the system with market-specific inputs that can be 
















3. Merge the inputs of steps 1 and 2 into an integrated asset allocation process, leading to the 
selection of the most suitable portfolio in terms of risk exposures and strategic asset allocation 
(SAA), as well as the tolerance to diverge from the SAA weights in order to apply tactical bets 
or to allow temporary allocation drifts; 
4. Choose the securities that will fill in the portfolio, both in term of nature (index funds, ETFs, 
mutual funds, alternative funds, or direct lines) and concentrations, and trade these 
securities; 
5. Ensure the follow-up: inform the investor about the composition and expected properties of 
the chosen allocation, monitor the portfolio and rebalance it according to a set of rules, and 
report ex post on the realizations. 
 
From the most basic to the most sophisticated system, one must recognize these five steps in a way 
or another. What can be “algorithmic” in this setup? The answer is: every single step, and the whole 
process as well. Step 1 induces the mapping of the investor’s information into a set of rules (be it 
parameters, ranges, ranks, clusters…) through a scoring system or a more sophisticated data gathering 
process. Step 2 involves the estimation of parameters that faithfully reflect the expected behavior of 
financial markets during the investment horizon. Step 3 performs, rigorously or not, quantitatively or 
not, an optimization process with the outputs of steps 1 and 2. Step 4 involves a screening of eligible 
instruments and weights from a universe of securities. Finally, step 5 involves simulations, risk 
management tools, and the calibration of a set of reporting guidelines. 
Essentially, the engine of a first generation robo-advisor (call it Robo-Advisor 1.0) can be implemented 
with an excel sheet within a short time frame. Why such a strong statement? Because many of these 
algorithms build on the takeaways of Markowitz’s (1952) Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) and Sharpe’s 
(1964) Capital Asset Pricing Model, which altogether provide convenient shortcuts into the IA process. 
Specifically, considering the enumeration above, a fairly standard set of principles emerge from the 
plain application of the more than one-half-century-old theory. In practice, however, the basic robo-



















Table 2: Adaptation of MPT and CAPM to the Robo-Advisor 1.0 algorithmic process 
Stage Principles Shortcut rules 
1. Individual 
analysis 
• Assess the investor’s investable wealth 
• Get the investor’s investment horizon 
• Estimate the investor’s risk aversion 
coefficient 
• Get a lump sum amount to invest 
• Map horizon to a volatility budget 
• Map risk aversion to a volatility budget 
2. Market 
analysis 
• Estimate the risky assets’ expected 
returns 
• Estimate the risky assets’ volatilities 
• Estimate the risky assets’ correlations 
• Get the risk-free rate for the 
investment horizon 
• Avoid expected returns through 
constant reward-to-volatility ratio 
• No shortcut 
• No shortcut 
• No shortcut 
3. Integrated 
allocation 
• Optimize the risk-return tradeoff of 
risky assets (mean-variance frontier) 
• Maximize expected utility through the 
allocation in the market portfolio and 
the risk-free asset 
No shortcut 
• Obtain the desired volatility budget 
through the allocation in the market 
portfolio and the risk-free asset 
4. Securities 
selection 
• Select index funds or equivalent to 
proxy for the components of the 
market portfolio 
• Use derivatives (futures, swaps) to 
short desired positions 
• Select index funds or equivalent (ETFs) 
to proxy for the components of the 
market portfolio 
• Constrain the optimization to be long-
only 
5. Monitoring 
• Run steps 1 to 4 regularly to update 
optimal portfolio weights 
• Report on expected and realized risk 
and return 
• Run steps 1 to 4 rarely enough to limit 
the transaction costs and tax frictions  
• Report of realized return only 
 
The price to pay for the implementation of a Robo-Advisor 1.0 is to accept a sort of “financial 
schizophrenia”. The use of the CAPM entails the necessity to adopt its assumptions, but the way it is 
implemented operationally denies some of its important properties, like the existence of a market 
portfolio, the objective to maximize the Sharpe ratio, and the linear relation between risk and 















Such a first generation robo-advisor can easily be rolled-out on a large scale with an industrial 
approach. To some extent, this generation of mechanized investment advisory service corresponds to 
a quite straightforward and natural segmentation: it is suited for low sophistication / low financial 
surface (retail) / low fee investors, i.e. mass market, while the upper segments of investors seeking 
real individual care will be adequately served with well-equipped advisors whose added value over 
simple machines can be directly identifiable. Since nothing prevents a financial institution to put in 
place an automated system without the “FinTech” label, this also explains why a disintermediated 
investment advisory offering is often proposed to retail and mass-affluent banking clients besides or 
together with the expert-based service that primarily targets private banking and asset management 
– which currently is the model adopted by those institutions that implement an omnichannel 
approach. 
Perhaps paradoxically, because of their limited scientific ambitions, these early robo-advisors have 
protected, at least until recently, the incumbent wealth management industry. Thanks to their ability 
to easily escape the theoretical framework of Modern Portfolio Theory and their capacity to complete 
investment advice with a set of ancillary services, experienced investment advisors have durably 
managed to keep robots out of the reach of their wealthy clients. At best, if some of these clients are 
attracted by the innovative image of robo-advisor, the opening of an account is usually perceived as a 
side, pocket money-like component of the global portfolio solution and at best as a marginal 
complement of “serious” portfolio management carried out by professionals. 
Robo-advice 2.0: A Strong Competitor in Wealth Management 
 
The second generation of robo-advisors is nowadays already well-developed. Without being genuinely 
revolutionary from a scientific point of view, it contributes to making the market segmentation 
induced by the first generation of robots much less natural. The customer targets of automated 
investment advice gradually leave the lower end of the wealth management spectrum and these 
systems start to invade the hunting territories of traditional private banks. The disruptive character of 
today’s robo-advisors is less technical than business-model related. 
Unlike what is commonly believed, the main reason for the threat of Robo-advice 2.0 towards the 
wealth management industry does not lie yet in the advent of Machine Learning or Big Data 
capabilities. Rather, it is the combination of innovative ergonomic approaches (a new ‘customer 
journey’), efficient industrialization of the personal portfolio management process, and the ability to 
convincingly integrate the sources of investor complexities regarding their behavioral characteristics 















The implementation of a rigorous mean-variance portfolio construction process involves closely 
following the principles set forth in Table 2. Nevertheless, constructing a second generation fully 
mean-variance-compliant robo-advisor is potentially useless for two reasons. First, mean-variance 
optimization, even when all inputs (investor-specific parameters and market-related variables) are 
carefully calibrated, results in portfolios that are just leveraged versions of the so-called market 
portfolio. This is not a very exciting solution and would probably not lead the client to accept a high 
payment for such a simplistic service.  
Second, and most importantly, mean-variance optimization is useless because the MPT simply does 
not hold. There are many reasons why this would not be the case, but they can be summarized by two 
(not mutually exclusive) dimensions: portfolio risk is not properly characterized by the variance (or, 
equivalently, volatility) or returns, and investors’ attitudes towards risk are not only depicted by their 
aversion to volatility risk. The designer of a modern robo-advisor must acknowledge this second 
dimension and must include the first one into its risk assessment. 
There are many ways to account for departures from the MPT. A common and very popular approach 
is the reliance upon behavioral finance, developed and theorized by Nobel Prize winners Kahneman 
and Tversky and, more recently, Richard Thaler.2 Amongst the many ramifications of this approach, 
we focus here on two of them that appear to be particularly important for our understanding of the 
evolution of robo-advice: the coexistence of the notion of loss aversion besides the one of risk 
aversion, and the prevalence of mental accounting in investment decisions.  
Loss aversion is a direct consequence of the asymmetry between people’s attitudes towards gains or 
losses. Because many people experience a much larger dissatisfaction by losing something they own 
rather than not gaining something that they do not own, this translates into a (somewhat) irrational 
attitude towards financial investments. For instance, the feeling of a loss-averse investor when he/she 
successively experiences a financial gain and a subsequent equivalent loss (like gaining 100€ and losing 
it immediately afterwards) will presumably be very negative and associated to a sentiment of regret. 
One may associate the tendency to observe this behavior with some lack of experience in financial 
markets: investors who are relatively newcomers (like successful entrepreneurs who have realized a 
substantial capital gain) might be prone to feeling regrets during adverse financial market conditions. 
These people are sometimes called ‘new money investors’. How does this behavioral trait potentially 
translate into preferences over risk?  
 
 
                                                          













Well, in order to mitigate this feeling, such investors would appreciate their portfolio to feature a 
certain level of protection (insurance) which, in spite of its upfront cost, might insulate them from 
severe market crashes. In a sense, highly loss-averse investors are particularly sensitive to the left 
(negative) tail of the distribution of returns and appreciate investments in securities with a convex 
payoff – like long positions in options – that reduce the negative skewness and large kurtosis of their 
portfolio. By contrast, the ‘old money investors’, who have been acquainted with individual portfolio 
management sometimes for several generations, are not likely to experience the same epidermal 
feelings towards large losses, and might even be induced to be net sellers of convexity (issuers of 
options) in order to capture the loss aversion premium.3 It is worth noticing that the notions of loss 
aversion and risk aversion (this latter one being related to the attitudes towards risky prospects), even 
though they are potentially connected, are distinct and thus complements of each other. Someone 
can be highly risk averse (sometimes called conservative) but not particularly prone to feeling regrets. 
On the other hand, some investors can have a high tolerance for risk, leading them to invest in very 
risky portfolios, but are nonetheless willing to insure their portfolio in order to avoid large losses at 
the cost of a significant insurance premium. The key to reconciling risk aversion and loss aversion, as 
shown by Plunus et al. (2015), is to allow the very notion of risk to be defined in a different way by 
people displaying different levels of loss aversion. 
Another strange tendency of individuals to depart from a pure rational, cold-blooded behavior is the 
largely documented ‘mental accounting’, as termed by Thaler (1985) and studied by Shefrin and Thaler 
(1988). This is a simple psychological process whereby individuals tend to categorize economic 
outcomes in different ledgers being more or less isolated from each other. This has direct implications 
for portfolio management decisions. For instance, the same person can decide to keep 10.000€ on a 
savings account that yields 0.01% and at the same time to borrow the same amount at the same bank 
with a rate of 2% to buy a car. For portfolio allocation decisions, that – widespread and well-
understood – phenomenon translates into the notion of goal-based investing, in which the global 
financial portfolio is partitioned into sub-portfolios whose purpose, horizon, risk budget etc. are 
distinct from one another.  
In an IA problem, the goal-based investing approach typically commands a two-step process in 
customer servicing: firstly, the set of specific goals is identified and parameterized, each of them 
resulting in a potential investment proposal. Secondly, the residual (when positive, otherwise the 
advisory process has to go backwards) is analyzed with a generic objective of wealth accrual.  
 
                                                          
3 This explains, for instance, why structured products with concave payoffs like covered calls are quite popular 













Expectedly, this bottom-up process can become very complex as optimizing the portfolio globally is 
not similar to summing up the optimized parts, and thus the potential issue of the generic objective 
portfolio optimization may result in a relatively complex technical issue.  
As shown in Figure 2, a profile map that addresses these two behavioral dimensions can actually be 
designed and can serve as the basis for an automated portfolio optimization process: 
- Risk aversion and loss aversion are represented along two axes: one for risk aversion (from 
the most aggressive to the most defensive profile), and one for loss aversion – also termed 
risk perception (from the investor most sensitive to extreme losses to the investor most 
sensitive to volatility), and the archetype of the optimal portfolio composition features more 
of less quantity of risk (risk aversion) and more or less convexity (loss aversion) depending on 
the diagnosed investor profile; 
- Goal-based investing can adequately result in a set of mapped profiles along with the two 
relevant dimensions of the investor’s aversion intensities. 
 
Once these dimensions have been adequately parameterized in the system, the portfolio choice 
results from a reverse-profiling process, in which any proposed allocation is confronted to each 
possible profile and is associated with the one that provides the best match. 
 























For both goal-based investment and the joint account of a client’s loss and risk-aversions, the 
computational capabilities of robo-advisors, which can deliver real-time portfolio solutions, provide 
them with a mighty advantage over traditional portfolio allocation systems. For instance, one may 
choose a compatible structure of investor’s preferences over risk and losses, such as Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1992) Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) or Bell’s ‘linear-exponential’ utility function (see 
Bell, 1988; Bell, 1995), assess (with an ad-hoc questionnaires or through an expert system) the 
investor-specific parameters, and construct rigorously optimized portfolios based on market inputs for 
each specific goal.  
The consolidation of the various goal-based investments is a child’s play for the tool, and it can even 
find an optimal allocation for the part of the patrimony that does not correspond to a specific goal – 
a remainder of wealth that is often associated to the ‘increase in general welfare’ objective. The non-
normality of returns is not an issue anymore, because the distributional properties of returns (for 
instance, left-asymmetry (skewness) and fat-tailedness (leptokurtosis)) can be adequately captured 
by these methods. Including convex or concave securities like options or some simple structured 
products is technically possible, without losing traction on the analytical portfolio optimization 
problem.  
Furthermore, MiFID II helps automated IA systems in their quest for increasing market shares. 
Naturally, the ban of kickbacks (commissions paid by fund managers directly to the advisor) and 
transparency of fees directly influences the investors’ perception of the cost/level of service ratio, 
which has already led to a sharp decrease in the level of fees and commissions in the whole IA industry. 
But the reinforcement of the monitoring of portfolio adequacy that is imposed by the regulation has 
also fueled the competitive advantage of second generation robotized portfolio management 
processes.  
Consider a portfolio that has been built at time t according to a profile . Because the profile is so 
complex, the dynamic evolution of the portfolio characteristics may get out of control if the risk type 
(horizontal axis) and level (vertical axis) are not jointly monitored. This is illustrated in the left part of 
Figure 3, with three portfolios that had been created three years ago with the same profile (defensive 
& protective) but which have experienced totally different behaviors over time. But irrespective of the 
portfolio itself, the investor’s characteristics evolve over time. Starting from a given profile, for 
instance a very neutral one both from the risk aversion and the loss aversion perspectives, many 
elements can plead for a significant profile drift (see Figure 3, right part). For instance, ceteris paribus, 
a portfolio that has experienced a large capital gain for an investor with decreasing relative risk 
aversion will automatically induce a higher tolerance for risk, but also an additional need for the 














When the portfolio objective involves a specific horizon (like retirement, for instance), as the deadline 
approaches, one may want to reduce the risk level and simultaneously protect past capital gains, 
leading the profile to move towards the South-West quadrant (purple arrow). Another phenomenon 
is the impact of experience gathering: as one becomes older, the desire to accept risk may vanish, but 
at the same time the learning effect on financial markets, with the experience of several financial 
cycles, makes the feeling of regret less painful and leads to a lower propensity to loss aversion: the 
profile moves then South-East (green arrow).  
 













Source: Gambit Financial Solutions 
All these are non-exhaustive examples of two-dimensional portfolio or profile drifts that a well-
thought system can anticipate and that a right information gathering process may lead to a semi- or 
fully-automatic profile revision. The point we wish to make here is not about the modelling choice 
underlying the process, but well the rather obvious attainability of an IA process that would be able 
to capture, to a satisfactory extent, the interaction of the rational and behavioral aspects of the 














Today, the real challenge lies in the ability of purely human (physical) or mixed human/machine 
(phygital) IA systems to catch up with the state-of-the art of Robo-advice 2.0. Even though there will 
still be a long way before robo-advisors get a very significant, if not dominant, market share in the 
wealth management industry, the seeds are being sowed right now, and the awareness of the current 
robo-advisors’ capabilities should at least ring a bell in a number of institutions. After decades of 
relative comfort, immobilism is not an option anymore. 
What’s next? Robo-advice 3.0 or a quasi-revolution… at the benefit of the customer 
 
It is obviously too early to provide a firm forecast of the evolution of the industry. Let us nevertheless 
try to imagine what could be a virtuous possible future.  
Eventually, the maturity of machine learning and ability to treat big (qualitative and quantitative) data 
in the investment advisory business might not represent such a disruption, at least not as big as the 
one that the current evolution of robo-advice. Our rationale is Darwinian: the survivors of the (soft) 
war between humans and robo-advisors 2.0 will simply have adapted, and successful (i.e. remaining) 
human-driven investment advisory systems will surely be endowed with the same quality of tooling 
as the one developed in the robo-advisory landscape. So what is the difference then? We are back to 
square one: confronted with presumably the same quality of basic service, the client will ultimately 
look for the non-replicable, fully individualized wrapping-up. The evolution of robotization could, if 
this scenario prevails, have resulted in two major changes: increase in the overall – but generalized – 
quality of tools, and sharp reduction of invoiced costs to the client. In fine, the customer will be the 
gainer, and will hopefully still have the choice between very cheap, high quality robotized investment 
advice, or slightly more expensive, also high quality but more holistic service with a warmer contact 
with a human being. Instead of a dramatic evolution or a disruption, we might indeed witness a 
revolution – in the etymologic sense of a 360° rotation. 
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